Managing Radioactive Waste Safely 2007 Consultation

The Managing Radioactive Waste Safely (MRWS) Consultation document MUST deal with the following:

1) Waste from new nuclear reactors

Consultees (during the Energy Review) were told that the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) had confirmed that waste from a new build programme could be technically accommodated by the options it was considering.

Mr Justice Sullivan, in his High Court Judgement, (1) said that the Government's Energy Review consultation document was this was not "a fair summary of CoRWM's true position" and concluded that:

"When dealing with the issue of waste, the information given in the 2006 Consultation Document was not merely wholly inadequate, it was also seriously misleading as to CoRWM's position on new nuclear waste".

CoRWM has also stated that future Government decisions on new build should be subject to their own public assessment process, including consideration of waste, because such decisions raise different political and ethical issues when compared with the consideration of wastes which already exist. The Committee also warned that a new nuclear programme might undermine support for CoRWM from some stakeholders and citizens and make it more difficult to achieve public confidence.

Following the High Court's conclusions, CoRWM has re-stated its position. In no sense, CoRWM says, should its position be read as providing any solution to the long-term management of any wastes arising from a new build programme. (2) The Committee has stated:

"CoRWM is concerned that its proposals are being interpreted as providing a solution to the long-term management of new build wastes in advance of the forthcoming White Paper on Energy. The judicial review has confirmed that such an interpretation is seriously misleading. We trust that it will be made clear that CoRWM's proposals apply only to committed wastes and that it will be accepted that a new process will be required to examine and justify any proposals for the management of wastes arising from new build".

So, a deliberate decision to create new nuclear wastes raises a whole new set of social, political and ethical issues which should be dealt with by a separate process. For example, new build wastes will extend the timescales for implementation, possibly for very long, but essentially unknowable future periods. The consultation document needs to say how the Government plans to carry out the "quite separate process" which CoRWM said new waste arisings would require.

The Committee also noted, in its final report on its recommendations (July 2006), that its estimates of timelines for operating and closing a repository for legacy wastes would only be met if, amongst other things, No new build waste is consigned to the repository. (3)

(2) Deep Geological Disposal - a qualified recommendation.

For existing waste, CoRWM recommended deep geological disposal, but also stressed the vital role of interim storage, because of the uncertainties involved in the implementation of deep disposal. CoRWM recognizes that as deep disposal might not eventuate, interim storage - possibly for more than 100 years, will be the main fall back position.  The heavily qualified aspect of CoRWM's recommendations must not be ignored in the consultation document, as so far seems to have been the case in Government statements. The concept of deep disposal is certainly not proven for the many thousands of years that containment and isolation of wastes would be required. The Environment Agency in its November 2005 review of Nirex's phased geological disposal concept, lists 10 'key technical challenges' "...where further work is needed before an acceptable repository safety case could be generated." (4) 

CoRWM called for an intensified research programme to resolve these questions. The consultation document needs to set out how these questions are going to be resolved.

After the public inquiry into Nirex's Sellafield proposal which ended on 1st February1996, the then Secretary of State for the Environment, John Gummer, said (17th March 1997), that he was rejecting Nirex's planning application. He explained his refusal saying that he remains:

"...concerned about the scientific uncertainties and technical deficiencies in the proposals presented by Nirex [and] about the process of site selection and the broader issue of the scope and adequacy of the environmental statement".

In a letter to Nirex he said: "your company does not understand the regional hydrogeological system well enough".

So, after more than 15 years of work and an expenditure of around half a billion of taxpayer's money, too many uncertainties still remained. Consultees need to know what progress has been made, if any, in the last decade, with regard to understanding deep geological disposal. The outstanding issues highlighted in the 1997 Inquiry report should be listed together with a report on progress made since then and plans to resolve issues which remain outstanding. 

(3) Interim Storage

CoRWM said that because of "the uncertainties surrounding the implementation of geological disposal, including social and ethical concerns" there should be a "continued commitment to the safe and secure management of wastes that is robust against the risk of delay or failure in the repository programme".

To fulfill this recommendation it will not be sufficient to simply rely on work that the NDA is doing already. Storage - and planning for longer than 100 years - needs to be made a much more central part of the MRWS strategy. The consultation should make clear, for example, what arrangements are being made for a review of storage to be carried out in the light of CoRWM's report.

4) Nirex-NDA merger.

The Government's announcement that Nirex would be merged with the NDA ran counter to the ethos of openness and transparency established by CoRWM. There was no consultation about whether the NDA is the most appropriate body to take forward long-term policy implementation, and there is a potential conflict of interest because the NDA is itself a waste producer. 

On 23 October 2006, NIREX published a paper (5) which referred to a legal opinion it had commissioned which said: 

"Our legal advice is that the NDA should not be involved in the site selection process for a repository. It already owns many nuclear sites, including the previous repository site in West Cumbria which still shows excellent potential. Moreover, the NDA has headquarters in West Cumbria and if the NDA or a body owned by the NDA were to partner with the West Cumbrian community with a view to building a repository there, then this would give the clear impression of a 'done deal' to the nuclear industry's critics and other communities elsewhere in the UK who may also wish to volunteer or partner. Counsel's advice is that this would provide NGO's with the potential for a successful legal challenge, especially at a public inquiry".

Such legal advice would preclude allowing the NDA to subsume, own or control the Nuclear Waste Management Organisation (NWMO), or any other body which might play a key role in all stages of site selection. The NWMO would advise on criteria for site selection in 2007 and assess sites for their suitability from 2008 onwards, using the deep repository concept itself to see if they can be short-listed. The final assessment and presentation of the safety cases (including the SEA and EIA) at a public Inquiry in around 2011 can therefore only be carried out by the NWMO in its role as independent concept holder.

The full legal opinion (a detailed 30 page document) was obtained under FOI by Greenpeace UK (6). In addition to the opinion NIREX obtained which raised the possible legal problems, the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology has asked Mr Ian Pearson, the Energy Minister, for clarification on this point. This has not yet been forthcoming.

The consultation document needs to say how the NDA will deal with this potential conflict of interest, explain the legal basis for its future actions and clear up any questions as to whether its remit is legally sound.

(5) Oversight of the implementation process

CoRWM also recommended the establishment of a body to independently oversee the policy implementation process, but the Government has only committed to a reconstituted CoRWM as an advisory body. Members of CoRWM have "substantial misgivings" about these plans, which they fear could undermine public trust. (7) The "misgivings" raised by CoRWM require a response in the consultation document.


(1) Full High Court Judgement
(2) CoRWM website, March 2007
(3) CoRWM Annex 5
(4) CoRWM Review of Nirex Viability Report 
(5) Creating a New Nuclear Waste Management Organisation (NWMO) to replace Nirex, published by NIREX on its website on 23rd October 2006, no longer available.
(6) Counsel's opinion in the matter of UK NIREX LTD, Mr C Katkowski QC and Mr S Tromans, 16 September 2006
(7) Sunday Herald 10th December 2006